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ABSTRACT 
It is well known that there is a lack of consensus about how to decide between 
competing and sometimes mutually contradictory theories, and how to integrate 
divergent concepts and theories. In view of this situation the IPA Project Committee 
on Conceptual Integration developed a method that allows comparison between 
different versions of concepts, their underlying theories and basic assumptions. Only 
when placed in a frame of reference can similarities and differences be seen in a 
methodically comprehensible and reproducible way. We used “enactment” to study 
the problems of comparing concepts systematically. Almost all psychoanalytic 
schools have developed a conceptualization of it. We made a sort of provisional 
canon of relevant papers we have chosen from the different schools. The five steps 
of our method for analyzing the concept of enactment will be presented. The first step 
is the history of the concept; the second the phenomenology; the third a 
methodological analysis of the construction of the concept. In order to compare 
different conceptualizations we must know the main dimensions of the meaning 
space of the concept, this is the fourth step. Finally, in step five we discuss if and to 
what extent an integration of the different versions of enactment is possible. 
 
KEY WORDS: enactment, countertransference, acting-out, Agieren, conceptual 





At present we find in psychoanalysis a vast array of theories with associated 
theoretical terms and concepts at different levels of abstraction. There has long been 
intense discussion about the epistemological status of psychoanalysis, leading to 
widely differing conclusions. This situation could be decried; however, in part it is a 
consequence of the peculiarities of the relationship between theory and practice that 
distinguishes psychoanalysis from other scientific fields. Study of an analyst’s 
practice shows that theories are always adopted individually. In an analytic session 
the analyst does not simply retrieve theoretical ideas and concepts from memory; 
rather, a process of discovery occurs in which he has to rediscover the theory based 
on the clinical material, even though for the most part he has already internalized it 
(Parsons 1992). In this way the analyst develops implicit and private theories, which 
are not conscious.   
The clinical process of gaining theoretical insights is linked to the individual 
case and related to the person and the situation. Generalizations have to start from 
these single, case-bound insights. At first the conceptual knowledge is implicit; then, 
more and more aspects of it are reflected on consciously, checked, verified, and 
enlarged with knowledge from further clinical material. Generally, the next step is to 
discuss the findings with colleagues, before they are written up into a paper and 
submitted for publication. Along this briefly outlined pathway of conceptual 
development the analyst stands in relation not only to the patient, but also to the 
virtual community of psychoanalytical practitioners with whom he seeks a sense of 
belonging when applying his theoretical concepts and technical principles. A 
narcissistic satisfaction results from sharing therapeutic ideals and concepts with 
others to whom he feels connected. In this way, as Grossmann (1995) has observed, 
theories become inner representatives of the group and its authority; here, theory 
becomes a function of object relations. Hamilton (1996) describes an attachment 
relationship that analysts enter into with specific theories and with charismatic 
analysts, which provides them with a feeling of security.  
Joseph Sandler called attention to another aspect of psychoanalytic theory 
formation. As early as the 1950s, when the Hampstead Index was being developed 
to compile precise definitions of central psychoanalytic concepts, the group of 
analysts involved found that, in practice, concepts undergo constant augmentation 
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and shifts in meaning. Sandler further defined this situation in his landmark paper of 
1983 on the analyst’s private implicit theories. Concepts do not possess 
unambiguous, determinable meaning but, rather, a spectrum of meanings. Relative 
precision can be obtained only by referring to the context in which the concept is 
used. Sandler refers to the “elasticity” of a concept; one no longer speaks of a single 
meaning, but of dimensions of meaning, and of a meaning-space in which these 
move depending on changes in the clinical context and the connections of meaning. 
These dimensions of meaning are determined by the perspective of the 
analyst looking at the clinical phenomenon. A single perspective cannot encompass 
all aspects and explain them in a comprehensive way. Because of the different 
underlying fundamental postulates and basic psychoanalytic assumptions, different 
analysts’ perspectives on the same phenomenon will lead to different versions of 
concepts and theories. The acknowledgement of this plurality of theories constituted 
a liberating advance within the analytic community, but it also had the potential to 
inhibit attempts to integrate concepts. Time and again, scientific discussions revealed 
that different psychoanalytic schools attributed completely different meanings to 
psychoanalytic concepts, including fundamental concepts, owing to their respective 
traditions of thought and culture. In fact, to date, there is no consensus about how to 
decide between competing and sometimes mutually contradictory theories, and how 
to integrate divergent concepts and theories. Beginning with Robert Wallerstein’s 
search for a “common ground”, the psychoanalytic community has repeatedly 
expressed the wish to identify convergences, at least with regard to clinical 
approaches, despite the existence of diverging theoretical positions. However, to 
date no substantially significant headway has been made.  
In response to a new initiative of the IPA President, Charles Hanly, in 2009, 
the IPA Board approved a mandate for the newly appointed Project Committee on 
Conceptual Integration, whose members are the authors of this paper. The purpose 
of the committee was “to find ways and means to enable members of the IPA to 
contribute to such integration of psychoanalytic theory as current, reliable knowledge 
of psychic reality makes possible . . . to substitute conceptual and clinical enquiry for 
chronic controversy without diminishing critical questioning and without encouraging 
ideological orthodoxy or authoritarianism.”  
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This is a major task, as one cannot fail to realize when undertaking a study of 
competing versions of primary concepts. The members of the Project Committee on 
Conceptual Integration understand themselves to be a core group which, by way of 
example, attempts to think through the problems that emerge from their task and to 
find a method by means of which concepts can be compared and their differences 
and similarities recorded.  
To begin with, the committee had to develop for itself a modus operandi with 
no tools other than a knowledge of different psychoanalytic theories and an 
awareness of the importance of approximating, comparing, and clarifying their main 
concepts. It was clear to us that such an endeavor was justified by the need to avoid 
the confusion, sterile antagonism, and dead ends in the theoretical discussions that 
are currently taking place in a context of theoretical pluralism.  Before we arrived at 
the methodology we describe in this paper, which we used to reach the conclusions 
about the concept of “enactment” presented below, on many occasions we found 
ourselves reproducing the very same configurations that are found in discussions of 
theoretical concepts within the different groups and societies. We came to look on 
ourselves as a hologrammatic representation of the effort to overcome the difficulties 
inherent in conceptual research itself.  
Let us begin with the important point that the plurality of concepts makes 
integration unlikely. How is it possible to integrate concepts which, originating in the 
different psychoanalytic traditions, differ entirely with respect to their fundamental 
assumptions and philosophies? When we reviewed earlier debates between analysts 
from different schools regarding concepts and theories, and the emotional storms 
that ensued (Green [2005] speaks of “bloody duels”), we had to ask ourselves 
whether this would be far too ambitious an aim. Another complicating factor is that 
close inspection of psychoanalytic work reveals that many authors employ familiar 
concepts idiosyncratically. One must therefore assume that alongside explicit, public 
definitions, there are also implicit ones that individual psychoanalysts draw on in their 
works. 
In view of the theoretical and clinical diversity of individual psychoanalytic 
concepts, we realized that we had to develop a method that would allow us to 
compare the different versions of concepts and their underlying theories, to place 
them in a frame of reference and see the similarities and differences. We opted to 
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study the problem systematically by means of an analysis of one concept initially. It 
seemed particularly promising to start with a concept close to clinical reality and 
which could be directly connected to clinical observation, and so we chose 
“enactment”/“countertransference enactment” for our initial analysis.  
Over the past 20 years, enactment has come to be seen as a vital concept in 
relation to the actualization of unconscious processes. It is an inevitable 
phenomenon in psychoanalytic treatment, and almost all psychoanalytic 
schools/traditions have developed a conceptualization of enactment. The analyst and 
the analysand become involved in an unconscious pattern of interaction and 
communication – a pattern that must be set within a scene, since the analysand is 
otherwise unable to express it. Countertransference enactment involves the 
occurrence of something unexpected and thus incompatible with the relevant rules of 
therapeutic technique. Because the analyst acquiesces on the affective level, his own 
vulnerability and personality enter directly into the treatment.  
For the purposes of our inquiry into the concept, we had to make a selection 
from the literature – a sort of probatory canon of relevant papers. In this selection, the 
mainstream theories from the Anglo-American tradition took center stage. Here, the 
French tradition, which has not developed a concept of enactment but has 
conceptualized the facts using other terms, has not been considered to the same 
extent as the Latin American, Italian, and German traditions. 
We have analyzed the following papers: from Kleinian psychoanalysis, Steiner 
(2000, 2006); from modern American ego psychology, Jacobs (1986, 2001), 
McLaughlin (1991), McLaughlin and Johan (1992), and Chused (1991, 2003); from 
self psychology, Goldberg (2002); and from relational psychoanalysis, Hirsch (1998), 
Levenson (2006), and Benjamin (2009).1 
Our method for analyzing concepts comprises five steps, each of which we will 
present in the following chapters. First, the history of the concept – its genealogy – 
has to be described. Secondly, we describe the phenomenology of the concept. In 
the third step, a methodological analysis regarding the definition of the concept has 
to be made. To be able to compare different conceptualizations of the clinical 
phenomenon, we need the main dimensions of its meaning space, which are 
                                                        




considered in step 4. Finally, in step 5, we attempt to see to what extent an 
integration of the different versions of the concept may be possible. 
 
Section 1  
The genealogy of enactment  
Introduction 
We present a historical perspective (or “genealogy”) to help to establish the origins 
and the development of the concept of enactment. This will be provided not so much 
through a record of dates and historical circumstances as by linking them to those 
theoretical turns that are at the root of the changes in the understanding and handling 
of “enactments” that we will discuss.    
The term “enactment” ¨was introduced into the psychoanalytic vocabulary in 
English some 25 years ago. Since then it has come to be increasingly commonly 
used in clinical discussions and publications. This term existed in English prior to 
being used in psychoanalysis (to mean, for example, the enforcement of a law, 
personification, or the performing of a role), and it remains widely used outside 
psychoanalysis. Other languages that lack an equivalent single term make use of a 
range of words or expressions to make explicit the various meanings of the English 
term. Similarly, analysts who wish to communicate with colleagues belonging to 
various analytic cultures that speak and write in different languages must overcome 
the problems of translation – first between languages and then between the different 
semantic contents of the terms employed in their respective theoretical and factual 
statements.  
As with other concepts in psychoanalysis, the English term spread into other 
languages, ultimately resulting in its general acceptance, mostly for the sake of 
expediency. However, this phenomenon is not universal owing to the existence of 
individuals and groups who are reluctant to incorporate such terms and prefer to 
keep using the terms they are most familiar with for descriptively similar realities. Two 
brief points can be made here. The first is that it may take varying amounts of time 
for new terms to be incorporated in different analytic cultures. Until this is achieved, 
confusions tend to arise due to lack of familiarity with the “newcomer” term and to the 
different “psychoanalytic values” that play a part in its acceptance; in addition, the 
attraction of something that appears as a novelty plays a part. The second is that this 
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process shows two different faces. On one side, it appears attractive because of an 
implicit possibility that agreement on the use of a new single term can be taken as 
equivalent to the resolution of theoretical dissent. The opposite side is that the same 
term appears in both observational and theoretical statements. The consequence of 
this is an apparent consensus at the observational level, which can be easily shared 
by many different observers. However, when it comes to explanatory statements 
about what has been observed, which are usually more difficult to accept, dissent re-
emerges. Furthermore, as observations are regularly linked to previous expectations 
and provisional hypotheses, the observational and theoretical levels inevitably 
overlap, further complicating matters.  
 
The road to enactment and its related problems 
Although “enactment” as a term of reference entered the psychoanalytic vocabulary 
approximately a quarter of a century ago, the concept it refers to – mainly related to 
the role and effects of actions in the course of psychoanalytic therapy – already 
existed and was referred to using other words. 
Actions of various kinds had attracted Freud’s attention from the beginning. In 
his early papers (Breuer and Freud, 1893/1973), Freud described the impressive 
actions performed in a theatrical fashion, and the “abreaction” whose visible 
expression can range from crying to vengeance. Later, Freud (1901/1973) made a 
study of parapraxes and other actions in our everyday life. However, these terms and 
concepts were used for actions at a time when a fuller understanding of the 
metapsychological implications was being elaborated. Therefore, the possible remote 
origin of a more complex concept of “enactment” has to be traced to the epilogue of 
the Dora case (Freud, 1905/1973a), where Freud introduced the German verb 
“agieren” to express his insights into the patient´s actions. In Strachey’s translation, 
the patient “acted out an essential part of her recollections and phantasies instead of 
reproducing it in the treatment”. With the growing expansion of English as a 
psychoanalytic lingua franca, Strachey’s term “acting-out” replaced the German term, 
and is still broadly used to refer to a certain kind of actions in psychoanalysis. 
Etymology can help us to establish interesting links in a “genealogical” study of the 
words we use and their underlying meanings. Terms commonly used in 
psychoanalysis such as to act, to abreact, acting-out, enactment, and “agieren”, as 
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well as everyday terms such as actuality or actually, have in common their origin in 
the Latin verb agere (to do). In this perspective we can consider “agieren” the 
inaugural psychoanalytic term for actions viewed from the perspective of what favors 
analytic treatment and what does not. We can assume it to be the inner thread that 
connects all of the following psychoanalytic developments about actions, including 
“enactment” and other related phenomena. 
The Dora case seems to have taught Freud many things, among them the 
limits and differences between verbal communication and actions meant to avoid it. 
When Freud (as translated by Strachey) says “acted out . . . instead of”, he is 
distinguishing what he considers to be helpful from obstacles to treatment; in other 
words, “acting out”¨ was introduced into the analytic vocabulary to describe those 
actions of a patient that go against the classic analytic method. Other related issues 
that are also present in the paper on the Dora case developed later into chapters on 
the theory of psychoanalytic technique; they are important for us because of the 
greater complexity they introduce in the psychoanalytic study of actions. Beyond 
purely descriptive statements about human conduct, actions now have to be put into 
the perspective of resistance and transference in the analytic setting, the goals of 
and the obstacles to analytic treatment. The later concepts of countertransference 
(1910/1973c , 1914) are also present – although implicitly – in Freud’s account. 
From this perspective, contemporaneous discussions about “enactment” can 
be seen as present-day versions of earlier yet still current psychoanalytic dilemmas 
related to actions (good or bad, helpful or detrimental) in the context of a therapeutic 
method known as a “talking cure”. Last century we discussed the goodness or 
badness of acting-out, whether or not acting-out belongs to the transference, and 
whether it is or is not an obstacle to therapy; analogously, we now discuss the 
inevitability of enactments, and the questions of who bears responsibility for them, 
whether we have to welcome them, and whether it possible to prevent them.  
 
Acting-out and a bifurcation in the psychoanalytic study of actions 
We will describe as “bifurcation” the separate and different approaches devoted by 
psychoanalysts to the study of actions as such, and of acting-out in particular, 
assuming it to be the most relevant in theory and practice. Actions can be studied as 
observable behaviour that can be addressed by points of view other than the 
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psychoanalytic one. Two examples are the study of rituals and the “psychopathology 
of everyday life” mentioned above. For a long time, actions in themselves did not 
attract much interest as an object of study from the wider psychoanalytic community. 
Heinz Hartmann probably had this in mind when he stated that there was a “lack of a 
systematic exposition of an analytic theory of action to which we could refer as an 
accepted body of facts and hypothesis, or at least one generally recognized as such” 
(Hartmann, 1947/1969). It was similarly the case for a great part of the past century 
that new developments in related fields where actions are also studied, such as law, 
philosophy of action, and psychology, did not attract much interest from 
psychoanalysts, and therefore were of no help for psychoanalysts in their own work. 
We suggest that the consequence was a delay in a general and broader 
psychoanalytic understanding of actions being reached. For a long time only actions 
categorized as “acting-out” attracted any interest; these constituted a body of study 
objects that contained a great deal of the theoretical and clinical problems that are 
now considered to relate to “enactment”. 
This intensive focus on acting-out was not without difficulties and 
contradictions. As Sandler stated, of all the clinical concepts considered in his book 
(Sandler, Dare, & Holder, 1973) it is the one that has been widened most and 
undergone the greatest changes in meaning since it was introduced by Freud. 
Among the many important contributions from leading analysts, impossible to quote 
here at length, it is worth mentioning those of Anna Freud (1968), Phyllis Greenacre 
(1950, 1962/1978), and Herbert Rosenfeld (1964/1965). It is very interesting – and 
revealing for our purposes – to find in that rich bibliography practically all the same 
issues as can be found in the consideration of enactments. Very briefly, acting-out 
was considered mostly detrimental for the working alliance by Greenacre, in 
opposition to the classic analytic therapeutic goal of remembering and working 
through by Anna Freud, and classifiable as either “partial” or “total” (respectively 
meaning possible or impossible to be contained and interpreted in analysis) by 
Rosenfeld.  
Analysts began to study actions as such again in the late 1950s and 1960s. 
Inevitably, this stimulated a simultaneous process of theoretical fertilization and 
change, due to some new inputs from linguistics and the theory of communication. 
Classical works in those fields are Austin (1962) and Searle (1969), both of which 
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incorporated the pragmatics of language and the “perlocutionary” effects of speech. 
Within the psychoanalytic field proper, in a classical paper Luisa Alvarez de Toledo 
(1954) identified unconscious phantasies underlying the act of speaking itself which 
can find some degree of existence in external reality when the words are spoken. 
David Liberman’s 1973 book “Linguistics, communicative interaction and 
psychoanalytic process” deals with actions inside and outside of the analytic setting. 
In his communicational and linguistic version of the classic psychopathology, he 
refers to action as a way of communicating something, including the wish to not 
communicate; in such situations the analyst can still retrieve information from the 
available observational data. Communication of some kind is acknowledged as 
inherent in all human interactions. Leon Grinberg (1957, 1968) expanded on 
projective identification as the prime defense mechanism in acting-out and introduced 
the concept of projective counter-identification. Wilfred Bion (1963/1977, 1965/1977) 
also referred to the use of speech as an action designed to get rid of dangerous 
contents of the mind. Willy and Madeleine Baranger (1962/1969) were among the 
first to conceive all that happens in the analytic situation (including actions) as being 
produced by the “analytic couple”  in an “analytic field”. The play technique and the 
use of communicative action in child analysis also enlarged the comprehension of 
actions in general and of acting-out in particular (Campo, 1957; Eckstein, 1966; 
Rodrigué and Rodrigué, 1966). In 1998, a colloquium on “Philosophic and 
psychoanalytic perspectives on action” was organized in Buenos Aires by the 
Association for the Epistemology of Psychoanalysis. One of the papers from this 
colloquium (Zysman, 1999) states that it is only by reference to their inferred 
unconscious phantasies that actions can be understood and classified according to 
their nature, motivation, and goals, in the context of the psychoanalytic theories of 
sexuality (Freud,1905/1973b; Meltzer, 1973).  
 
Enter “enactment” 
In the preceding paragraphs, taking a historical perspective, we have traced 
the pathway leading up to the arrival and extended use of the concept of enactment 
in the psychoanalytic vocabulary, and also sought to establish whether any previous 
existing term could be considered conceptually related or equivalent. To try to 
answer such questions, which are left open by the genealogical approach, we need 
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to focus again on the ways in which the use of the terms, and the theoretical and 
clinical needs they are supposed to satisfy, have evolved.  
It is usually accepted that the first appearances of the term “enactment” can be 
found in Jacobs´ papers (1983, 1986), and in the controversy with Andre Green in 
the 1993 Congress in Amsterdam, subsequently published in the International 
Journal of Psychoanalysis. It is also considered that Joseph Sandler’s papers (1976, 
1977) are at the root of this innovation, based on his concept of “role 
responsiveness”, which also tried to account theoretically for given clinical situations 
involving the countertransference in particular. Jacobs also mentions the 
countertransference and quotes Racker’s (1968) classification into direct and indirect 
countertransference. These are important references to keep in mind because it is 
also a fact that the term “enactment” tends to be predominantly used for the analyst’s 
countertransferential engagement in actions. The theoretical background described 
by both Jacobs and Sandler locates enactments in an object world; while Jacobs 
refers to the emotional responses of the analyst and the subsequent displacement 
into objects “in the patient’s inner world”, Sandler resorts to projective identification 
as the defense mechanism that accounts for enactments. The picture from the 
genealogic approach would not be complete without mentioning Betty Joseph’s 
(1999) paper “From acting-out to enactment”. In this paper, which was presented at 
the British Psychoanalytic Society for Sandler’s Memorial Day, the approximation in 
theoretical and clinical matters between acting-out and enactment is evident. 
Sandler’s use of terms as “actualization” and “role responsiveness” is carried on in 
the explanation of a clinical example. The title of her paper is briefly picked up when 
she states: “the whole development in this area of enactment has brought an 
important shift of emphasis . . . from what we could call “acting-out” to “acting-in”, 
enactment – that is to the pressure to act within the transference relationship”. The 
greater potential to share descriptions and opinions, and use similar terms for 
statements mainly referring to clinical facts, becomes evident. But the problems 
related to the use of apparently similar concepts within different theoretical 
frameworks are still in need of a thorough examination [my best guess but this needs 
checking by one of the authors]. 
Jacobs, Sandler and Joseph, with their different theoretical backgrounds, each 
played an important part in the spreading and generalized use of the term 
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“enactment”. This is true at least in English-speaking countries and others that simply 
incorporated the term into their own languages, such as Argentina and Brazil (see 
Cassorla, 2007). In contrast, French-speaking analysts seem to be quite comfortable 
with the use of “mise en act”. Finally, and to close the discussion on “genealogy”, we 
feel that it is useful to have a shortlist of “enactment”-related issues pending 
theoretical discussion, in view of the undeniable fact that the term seems “to have 
arrived to stay”. It would help a lot to know what each of us has in mind when 
referring to action, acting-out, acting-in, enactment, setting, projective identification, 
object relations, transference, countertransference, communication, remembering, 
repeating, and so on. This is why the concept of “enactment” needs a profound and 
extensive discussion in the context of the diverse theoretical psychoanalytic 
backgrounds and the rich existing bibliography. 
 
Section 2  
The description of enactment as a clinical phenomenon 
We believe that clinical practice can be comprehended, at least partially, on its own 
merits. This, of course, does not involve underestimating the value of theory, but 
rather, facing [not clear what this means – ‘examining’? Or ‘undertaking’? Or both?] 
clinical practice with a stricter and more systematic methodology that is, at the same 
time, faithful to the psychoanalytical method. The point is to remain as close as 
possible to the clinical description. We believe that applying the phenomenological 
method to the observation and description of clinical phenomena arising from the 
psychoanalytical situation is a necessary and fruitful first step to “grasping 
psychoanalysts’ practice in its own merits” (Jiménez 2009).2 
Here we will attempt to describe how the phenomenon that we call enactment 
indeed “appears” in the mind of the analyst; how it takes shape in the immediacy of 
his subjective experience. Etymologically, the term “phenomenon” is derived from the 
Greek word phaino, which means “to appear”. This means that, in its most original 
sense, a phenomenon is an “appearance” and, therefore, a relational event. It is “a 
being for someone else”, as opposed to a being in itself, independently from its 
                                                        
2 Phenomenology is used here as a tool for clinical observation and not as a philosophical school with all 
its epistemological assumptions. 
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apprehension by anyone else. Thus, to study enactment as a clinical phenomenon 
implies analysis of it as an intersubjective event. Not by chance, in his pioneering 
work Theodore Jacobs (1986) talks about enactment as a countertransference 
phenomenon. In this seminal paper, Jacobs introduces the term “countertransference 
enactment” when referring to subtle acting-outs on the part of the analyst, whose 
origin may be found in the impact of the patient’s transferences on the analyst’s 
mind. We start, then, from the basis that enactment is defined from the analyst’s 
experience, within the relational field he establishes with the patient.   
Our first step was to try to determine whether the analysis of theoretical-
clinical works regarding the concept of enactment, written by psychoanalytical 
authors belonging to different traditions, allows for the development of a 
“phenomenology of enactment”. Our objective, therefore, was to compare various 
authors from the perspective of how they describe (if they do so at all) such 
enactment, based on their own subjective clinical experience. Ultimately, all things 
considered, a phenomenology cannot do without a theory. This becomes particularly 
clear when attempting to explain the discrepancies between the definitions and 
descriptions given by different authors regarding the same phenomenon. The 
preferred theory of individual authors seems to make them prone to skewing certain 
features or to highlighting some over others. This is particularly clear when trying to 
define the “best practice” for handling or resolving enactments.   
In what follows, the phenomenology of enactment will be described as a 
sequence of five stages of a complex clinical process. 
 
Stage 1. Status quo ante: The “normative” analytic relationship 
From a phenomenological perspective, we assume that the patient and analyst both 
have an intentional representation of each other and their relationship. This is made 
up of expectations of the thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and desires that each anticipates 
from the other and is founded primarily on the verbal exchanges that occur between 
the two individuals. These models, while constantly updated and governing the 
interpersonal actions of the analytic dyad, remain descriptively unconscious as long 
as the two participants behave in line with the broad expectations that the model 
generates for each of them. However, these expectations are constantly challenged 
by both the patient’s and the analyst’s unconscious phantasies, which, while integral 
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to the process of relating, must be kept in the background if the relationship is to 
achieve its intended objectives. All psychoanalytic models assume the presence of a 
constant tension between the analyst’s anticipated action and the patient’s hope, 
based on transferential phantasy. The analyst’s resistance to this pull is encoded into 
analytic jargon as “neutrality”, which, as discussed above for other concepts, actually 
means very different things to different cultures and different analytic relationships. 
However, in all cases the term encodes a normative set of expectations about 
relating – a demotivated grammar of discounted expectations, in terms of structuralist 
linguistics. There is a tension between this normative way of the analyst’s being and 
the patient’s natural wish to express himself through every mode of communication 
available to him, including the nature of the relationships he creates with his analyst.  
 
Stage 2. The enactment as a breakdown of the normative relationship 
The enactment represents a rupture in the analyst’s conscious experience of himself 
by a deviation from this normative process of interpersonal experience. Suddenly, 
something seems to be incomplete; the analyst is thrown off balance, he loses the 
sense of his normal analytic functioning, and this sudden awareness of discontinuity 
causes a disruption in the phenomenological field. This involvement in the 
unexpected collapse of the analyst’s theory resulting from whatever is going on in 
that moment in the process is described by the various authors in a fairly similar way: 
“I discovered in myself an unusual phenomenon” writes Jacobs (1986, p. 294); or 
“the analyst does . . . get emotionally involved . . . in a manner he had not intended” 
(Boesky, 1990, p. 573). Every description indicates the existence of a certain 
pressure to act on the part of the analyst, which at the time he does not understand. 
One might say that the analyst “catches himself in the act”. The pressure the analyst 
experiences can take different forms, such as sleepiness, boredom, nodding off, 
confusion, anxiety, or elation. For Steiner (2006, p.136), an enactment is produced 
as an attempt on the part of the analyst to diminish tension. This phenomenological 
quality of enactment is highly compatible with the dictionary definition:  
“The dictionary definition of enactment refers to acting, or representing on the 
stage. The same word is also used in legal language, where the original idea 
of the legislator is transformed by the force of enactment into a binding statute, 
which the people must obey lest they be punished. So, [and applied to the 
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psychoanalytic situation] dramatic enactment by the patient expresses her 
wish that the analyst, who is her audience, will join her in a suspension of 
disbelief characteristic of a play” (D. Boesky, in McLaughlin & Johan 1992, p. 
832) 
 
Stage 3. An enactment is discovered by the analyst after it happened 
A posteriori, observing his own countertransference, and through signals given by the 
patient, the analyst realizes that he has transgressed the “best psychoanalytic 
technique” (which requires him to remain on a symbolic and verbal level), entangling 
himself in enacting with his patient. At any rate, the analyst’s attention focuses on a 
type of immediate action that involves him in a relationship with the patient. This 
action may also be verbal, as in interpretive enactments. Implied in this act of 
discovery by the analyst is, first, a review of his acts over the past moments (the 
phenomenological window of his actions of which he has awareness) and second, a 
comparison of this act to past acts by the same analyst in similar circumstances 
within his own episodic memory or representations of ideal analytic behavior 
encoded in semantic memory systems. Both the review and the comparison are 
intentional acts in a phenomenological sense, and thus themselves liable to be 
affected by limitations of self-awareness.  
 
Stage 4. Collusion acknowledged, sense of analytic functioning restored 
The review and comparison in relation to the specific situation leads the analyst to 
think that, amid the psychoanalytical situation, the patient’s transference phantasy 
has been “actualized”. This means that the gap between the analyst’s intended 
stance and the act he has observed himself engaging in can be made to seem 
complete if he posits that he has unconsciously acted consistently with the patient’s 
experience of him, or some other derivative or residue of the patient’s experience of 
the relationship within the context of the complex role-relationships that exist 
between the two individuals. In an established analytical process, both patient and 
analyst are committed to remain at the symbolic and verbal level of things. When 
analysts find themselves involved in action (“colluding” with the patient’s unconscious 
desires or simply acting consistently with the implied role-relationships that they are 
both experiencing), the model implies that patients will often perceive the change of 
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experience – that is, that the analyst acted in line with the patient’s phantasy (not that 
of the analyst). This may not cause a disruption in the patient’s conscious experience 
of the relationship, but the patient may nevertheless communicate it to the analyst 
(via dreams, for example). The analyst’s enactment thus may be understood as the 
consequence of a sort of automatic, unconscious attempt to release the 
countertransference tension. This raises the question of why the analyst gave in to 
this tension at this particular moment, given that the tension is a more or less 
constant background presence. It may be that at that moment the pressure from the 
patient was particularly intense, or the analyst’s capacity to resist the pressure was 
particularly weak. But, regardless of these specific intrasubjective considerations, we 
may say that, from this phenomenological perspective, all enactments are “co-
enacted”. 
 
Stage 5. Solving an enactment: From threat to opportunity 
At this last stage of the complex process we have described, we encountered 
different paths by which the enactment is solved. Kleinians, for example, typically 
redirect, through interpretation, the enactment toward the patient’s transference 
phantasy, which, via projective identification, would have induced the analyst to 
collude with it, gratifying it. Others, such as certain contemporary Freudians and 
relational psychoanalysts, also seek, via self-analysis, the roots of their own internal 
world, and they interpret from there.  
Relational psychoanalysts recommend that, if the countertransference 
enactment would have implied retraumatizing the patient, the analyst acknowledges 
this failure of empathy before the patient, as part of the process of enactment 
interpretation (Benjamin 2009).  
In any case, the phenomenological model we propose is in line with current 
consensus across the psychoanalytic schools. We conclude that enactments are 
inevitable, and that if they are subjected to analysis afterwards, they may become a 
powerful means to reach inner depths dissociated from the self, such as early 
traumatic experiences.  
 
Section 3  
The rules of discussion 
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General criteria for the construction of concepts 
It would be useless to try to hold a discussion on any concept unless we first agree 
on some rules or criteria by which to assess our respective arguments. Perhaps the 
first thing to establish is that we are working with psychoanalytic concepts. So we 
must start with an operational definition of “psychoanalysis” itself – a definition broad 
enough to admit discussion from the many corners of our large community, yet 
specific enough to ensure that the name “psychoanalysis” does not imply that 
“anything goes”. We believe that it is safe enough to stay with the pragmatic 
definition provided by Freud (1923), according to which psychoanalysis is, firstly, a 
specific procedure for uncovering mental processes that are otherwise not 
accessible, secondly, a method of treatment derived from the investigative 
procedure, and only thirdly a set of psychological views (concepts) acquired through 
the practice. Freud stated that the last component is the most variable of the three, 
being subjected to revisions in view of what the practice teaches. This should not 
pose any problem for us, since it is precisely what we have set out to study: whether 
or not  concept “X” should be part of the set of psychoanalytic ideas. Hence, our work 
is directed at the third part of Freud’s definition, and we must consider the question of 
whether psychoanalytic concepts are consistent with a widely shared description of 
the psychoanalytic procedure. In other words, the lessons from our practice are 
deemed to be the guiding factors, so that ours is a mostly pragmatic (in the 
philosophical sense of “pragmatic”) endeavor. 
Starting from the procedural definition of psychoanalysis formulated by Freud, 
we must then agree on the procedure by which a concept is formulated. A very good 
and pragmatic model of concept formation was put forward, again by Freud (1915), in 
the opening paragraphs of “Instincts and their vicissitudes”, A brief summary of is this 
model would be: 
 
1. No science ever starts with clear and sharply defined concepts; rather, it begins by 
describing phenomena and then proceeding to group, classify, and correlate them. 
2. Even at that stage, however, it is impossible to avoid applying certain preexisting 
abstract ideas to the material at hand – ideas derived from somewhere. These ideas 




3. We come to understanding the meaning of these ideas by constant reference to 
the material from which they appear to be derived, but upon which, in fact, the ideas 
have been imposed. Strictly speaking, at this stage they are in the nature of 
conventions. Yet they must have been chosen because of their significant relations to 
the empirical material, relations that we “sense” before being able to demonstrate 
them. 
4. Only after a more thorough investigation of the observational field are we able to 
formulate more precise concepts and modify them so that they become serviceable 
and consistent over a wide area.  
5. Then, the time may have come to confine them in definitions. The advance of 
knowledge, however, does not tolerate any rigidity, even in definitions. As physics 
illustrates, even “basic concepts” that have been established in the form of definitions 
are constantly being altered in their content. 
 
From this short summary, and with the help of additional reflection on the 
acquisition of knowledge, it becomes possible to propose a number of criteria for the 
construction of a sound concept. These, then, constitute the minimal set of criteria 
that the eventual participants in a conceptual discussion should be required to accept 
beforehand if the discussion is to be useful: 
 
A. Relevance: Does the concept belong to the domain of psychoanalytic practice and 
thinking as defined above? 
B. Refutability/falsifiability: Can one think of a counterfactual, that is, something that 
is not referred to by our concept and would even be an exception to it? This is to 
make sure that the concept has a meaning, that is, a possible use, since a concept 
that is not potentially falsifiable cannot really be “worked with” in either practice or 
theory. 
C. Procedure (operational definition): A concept should, as far as possible, point to 
some observable phenomenon. In the case of psychoanalysis (in accordance with its 
definition, as above) “observable” does not necessarily mean “behavioral”; it can 
refer to some “private” experience not visible from a third-person point of view. Yet, 
since our discipline is essentially a practice, we should be able to describe the 
procedure by which the phenomenon related to our concept can be obtained. This 
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operational definition allows for some degree of reliability. For instance, a patient 
might say that whenever the analyst makes an interpretation, he feels a “burn” in his 
belly: this is not observable by the analyst or any other third person, but the fact 
remains that the patient reports the same experience each time, and if interviewed by 
another person, the patient could attest that he had indeed experienced such a 
sensation after an interpretation was given to him. 
D. Internal consistency: Every concept should be internally consistent, that is, it 
should refer to similar phenomena at different times and in different situations. In 
other words, it should be relatively easy for others to find the concept “serviceable”, 
as Freud would have it (see point 4 above). 
E. Contextual or intratheoretical consistency: While the concept should make sense 
(that is, be serviceable) it should also be contextual or consistent by inserting itself 
with relative ease into the ensemble of preexisting psychoanalytic concepts. If it fails 
to do so, then two things are possible: either it is a false or empty concept, possibly a 
non-psychoanalytic concept (e.g., the concept of “magnetic fluid” may have served to 
“explain” some clinical facts such as the patient’s affectionate attitude towards the 
therapist, but, for one thing, it is not a psychoanalytic concept); or its inconsistency 
with the prevailing theory is not a defect at all but reveals itself as a signpost of the 
need for a major modification of the existing theory. (As an example, think of the 
concept of “narcissism” and how it entailed major changes in psychoanalytic theory.) 
F. Parsimony (Occam’s razor): We should always ask ourselves, “Is this concept 
necessary or is it just another word for things that are already known but 
conceptualized differently?” This is important if we are to avoid multiplying concepts 
that add nothing to our knowledge but only serve to increase confusion in language. 
We could call this a requirement for the concept to have uniqueness or a distinct 
character, running contrary to the often-mentioned “narcissism of small differences”. 
G. (Optional) Extra-analytic convergence: As much as we would like to add external 
validation to our list, we have to stop short of doing so: ours is not an experimental 
science and therefore we cannot expect any experiment to unequivocally support or 
disprove a claim about a concept or a theory. What we may look for instead is some 
form of direct or, more frequently, indirect correspondence to – or convergence with – 
extra-analytic observations or concepts (e.g., concepts from the neuroscientific, 
philosophical, linguistic, anthropological, or other domains.) This is often a delicate 
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maneuver, requiring particular thoroughness on the part of analysts. Indeed, many 
authors, when turning to other disciplines for support, easily let go of the specific 
psychoanalytic stance in favor of the other, seemingly more robust “scientific” 
theories. We find it necessary to reassert at this point that psychoanalysis is an 
independent discipline, endowed with a specific method, a specific object of inquiry, 
and a specific set of concepts. When turning to other disciplines that appear to be 
studying phenomena related to the ones we investigate, we must beware of creating 
amalgams, or else our enterprise would be useless.  
 
Other criteria could probably be added to this list, but we believe that the ones 
mentioned above are sufficient to ensure a reasonable epistemological “treatment” of 
a given conceptual problem in psychoanalysis and, therefore, a useful discussion of 
any given psychoanalytic concept. 
 
Testing this model 
Let us now see what happens if we put the concept of “enactment” to the test of our 
requirements. 
 
A. Relevance: The requirement of relevance seems to be easily satisfied, as the idea 
of enactment resulted from the description of events occurring within the analytic 
setting and by way of the contrasting between those events and the expected 
analytic attitude.  
B. Refutability/falsifiability: By the same token, refutability is apparently provided 
precisely by the exceptional nature of enactment.  As mentioned above, “enactment” 
is considered an occurrence so much in opposition to the expected attitude of the 
analyst that we feel assured of its particular referent and its counterfactuals. We can 
easily establish that in analysis not everything is an enactment. One could, for 
instance, describe a timely, appropriate, and useful interpretation arrived at by the 
analytic dyad as being contrary to an enactment. 
C. Procedure: The operational description is somewhat complicated, since 
“enactment” describes the result, at the moment of its occurrence, of some failure in 
the analyst’s capacity for holding or containment, for the handling of his 
countertransference, or, more generally, for symbolization. The word “failure” has 
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here no moral or other pejorative connotation; it simply means a shift in the mode of 
expression. For this reason, we cannot describe a definite procedure for observing 
enactments but only resort to the negative description of a shift (or “failure”) from a 
symbolic to a sub-symbolic form of expression; this, however, can be deemed to be 
sufficiently operational in its own right. 
D. Internal consistency is to some extent problematic in the case of enactment. While 
the work of any single author could be deemed to provide such internal consistency 
(this would, of course, require examining the issue from up close), there is some 
inconsistency in the ways that different authors use the concept. There is room here 
for consultation, debate, and eventual reformulation in order to arrive at a sufficiently 
internally consistent definition of the concept. This is, of course, precisely the reason 
we are proposing the present criteria! 
E. Contextual or intratheoretical consistency does not seem to pose a major problem, 
although we shall see that this issue overlaps with that of conceptual parsimony. By 
its very nature of being defined, at least at its inception, as an unwarranted event in 
the context of a transference-laden relationship, the idea of enactment can be 
seamlessly woven into psychoanalytic theory without requiring significant 
modification of the latter. It seems to find its place in a cluster of concepts such as 
transference, countertransference, acting-out, acting-in, holding, symbolization, 
repetition, and so on. More generally, the concept cannot help but raise more 
fundamental theoretical questions, such as the theory of mind implied (e.g., how to 
conceive of the relationship between thinking and acting, the nature of thinking, 
speech as action, and so on). 
F. Parsimony: Conceptual parsimony is, in our view, what poses the greatest 
challenge for “enactment”. This problem resonates with the issue of internal 
consistency, but at a more profound level. Indeed, we could ask: Why is it that the 
concept of enactment is widely used in the psychoanalytic tradition within English-
speaking regions, but much less so in Latin America or France? Cultural factors may 
well play a role, but it could also be that the pre-existing theory is being used 
differently in these regions. For instance, it may be that transference and 
countertransference are conceived of differently in North America or Germany than in 
France, such that enactment is considered to be a remarkable event in one milieu, 
requiring a specific name, but is currently implied in the definition of, say, 
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countertransference or projective identification in other milieus, and therefore did not 
call for an additional concept. From this example, we can see that when a new 
concept is introduced, it becomes necessary to define  neighboring concepts more 
thoroughly in turn, given the inevitable interrelatedness of concepts. 
G. Extra-analytic correspondence, or, external validation, do not seem to apply in the 
case of enactment. 
 
In conclusion, we consider that a fairly good consensus around the definition 
of “enactment” is attainable, but not a full agreement, since there are residual 
problems regarding at least two criteria: internal consistency and conceptual 
parsimony. This does not preclude the acceptance of enactment as a robust concept 
in its own right, but it seems likely that for this to happen we will need to re-examine 
some neighboring concepts and eventually redefine their borders. One can also 
imagine that cultural differences will remain, since psychoanalysis is essentially a 
socially and culturally embedded practice. So, the possibility remains that enactment 
will be viewed by, say, a French analyst as just one manifestation of 
countertransference (“un agir contre-transférentiel”), which can therefore be 
accounted for through that concept rather than requiring a separate one. In that 
scenario, “enactment” may still have a meaning (use), but simply as a description of 
one way in which countertransference is instantiated. An American colleague, on the 
other hand, thinks of “countertransference” in a way that does not account for the 
kind of events that “enactment” describes. This shows that the concept of 
countertransference is itself somewhat “nudged” by the insertion of “enactment” into 
our analytic vocabulary, and should probably itself undergo a similar critical scrutiny. 
 
Section 4  
Giving meaning to the phenomenon of enactment in the different conceptual versions 
Enactment involves a collapse in the analytic dialogue in which the analyst is drawn 
into an interaction where he unwittingly acts, thereby actualizing unconscious wishes 
of both himself and the patient. This collapse implies disturbance of the symbolic 
function; something emerges that at the moment of enactment is not accessible by 
language. What follows this moment will determine whether the enactment will have 
therapeutic value, that is, whether the symbolic function will be restored and 
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integrative work can happen or not. Both earlier symbolized (repressed) material and 
earlier not-symbolized (trauma-related) material may emerge. Further, enactments 
can be patient-induced, analyst-induced (Ellman, 2010), or mutual (McLaughlin, 
1992), for example, when the analyst’s enacted response further undermines the 
symbolic exchange. 
Most reports describe an enactment as a definable episode in a process with 
more or less clear distinctions between the pre-phase, the actual moment, and the 
post-phase. Enactment may, however, also be prolonged and built into the analyst’s 
habitual technique (Jacobs, 1986).  
Enactment is conceptualized differently according to the underlying theory of 
each contributor. In Section 2, we identified the existence of significant 
phenomenological differences, but also noted that there are overlaps rather than 
clear boundaries between different conceptions. Differences in explicit or implicit 
theory may also make different conceptualizations of enactments incompatible. 
With the extended conception of countertransference, exemplified by the 
concept of enactment, the analyst’s personal idiosyncrasies are focused in [‘become 
a focus of’?] psychoanalytic theory. This poses new challenges for psychoanalytic 
theorizing of the analytic dyad, especially since enactment is a stochastic event 
(partly non-deterministic) that confronts theory with uncertainty relations. From this 
perspective, enactments may not be foreseeable or preventable.  
Different perspectives on enactment are found in the literature. Enactment is 
seen variously as a deviation from the norm; as a deviation from good standard 
technique and handling of the psychoanalytic situation; as a hermeneutical 
misreading and “wrong” reaction on the part of the analyst, based on the analyst’s 
own conflicts; as a co-constructed interactional event between subjectivities; or as an 
integral aspect of the ongoing dialogue between analyst and patient.  
The rule of psychoanalysis is “speech not act”. The aim of symbolizing 
unsymbolized material, or making unconscious material conscious, functions as an 
ethical demand. Against this background, enactment appears as an unintentional 
breakdown of this rule. The ensuing collapse of the symbolic function implies a 
collapse of the ethics of psychoanalysis (i.e., moral third; Benjamin, 2009).  
How the enactment process is understood, and what technical implications 
follow from this understanding, diverges in the theories of the different schools. The 
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elasticity of concepts referred to earlier (Sandler, 1983) implies that we must 
investigate the formation of a concept in greater depth; one way to do this is to 
identify dimensions of meaning related to a concept. In this study, we have chosen a 
categorical approach to the study of enactment and identified salient dimensions of 
the concept, enabling a detailed study of different schools’ conceptualization of 
enactment. One may then see which dimensions seem to be the most salient for 
judging compatibility or incompatibility and deciding what degree of integration is 
possible. 
Broadly speaking, there are four major approaches to enactment, coinciding 
with the Kleinian school, modern American ego psychology, self psychology, and 
intersubjective/relational psychoanalysis. In addition, there is the French tradition, 
where the concept of enactment is seldom used but similar phenomena are 
described (e.g., “mise-en-scène”), and a German tradition where there has been a 
long history, largely unrecognized by the wider analytic community, of studying how 
the analyst may be drawn into unconscious scenarios and act according to them 
(“Mitagieren”; Klüwer, 1995).  
The task for this project was to investigate whether the concept of enactment 
is necessary on a theoretical level (or whether other concepts in fact relate to or 
“cover” the same phenomena), and, if it is deemed necessary for theory, whether it is 
useful in clinical practice. In Section 3 we identified problematic areas related to the 
concept’s operational description, internal consistency, and conceptual parsimony. 
Investigating the dimensions of the concept is one way to specify the character of this 
lack of clarity and its implications [needs checking by authors]. 
We have identified some dimensions which we will analyze in order to 
demonstrate the dimensional approach, while remaining aware that we cannot do full 
justice to the nuances of each contribution and also that some important 
contributions will not be covered.  
 
1. Action versus thought 
Action and thought may be seen as dichotomous, or as two sides of the same coin. 
Some Kleinians hold a dichotomous view and regard enactment as acting-out where 
thinking (containment, reflection) should have occurred. Steiner, for example, writes 
that a situation with strong feelings should alert the analyst to the need to revise his 
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way of looking at the material. The analyst may then interpret instead of acting. It is, 
however, often only after the fact that the analyst become aware of the enactment, 
and it is then seen as a failure of the capacity for containment (Steiner, 2000). 
Jacobs (2001, p 654) refers to situations in which particular needs, conflicts, 
and biases of the analyst, not infrequently rooted in narcissistic conflicts, lie 
embedded within his quite proper and correct interventions. Two forms of 
countertransference enactments are identified: (a) Those activated on a nonverbal 
level, which cannot be identified beforehand and can only be worked through after 
the fact; (b) Those communicated through affects, thought, fantasy, or memory, 
which can be contained through reflection and self-analysis.  
Levenson (relational school), on the other hand, holds that enactment is not 
only a feeling the therapist is having, like a countertransference, but a pattern of 
behavior between analyst and patient. It is a continuous and ubiquitous process, and 
is the behavioral component of what is being talked about (Levenson, 2006). The 
psychoanalyst’s subjectivity will always be present in interventions, attitudes, and so 
on, and will non-consciously or unconsciously “intervene” in the analytic relationship. 
Enactment is thus not a specific event; the analyst is acting his subjectivity all the 
time. Renik (1993, p. 560) states: “It is impossible for an analyst to be in that position 
[objectively focused on the patient’s inner reality] even for an instant since we are 
constantly acting in the analytic situation on the basis of the personal motivation of 
which we cannot be aware until after the fact”. In this last conception, enactment is 
not a specific event or even a “deviation” built into the analyst's habitual technique; 
rather, the analyst is acting his unconscious subjective motivation all the time. 
Thinking and acting are two sides of the same coin. 
 
2. Levels of symbolization or desymbolization 
Symbolization is closely connected with remembering. Scarfone holds that 
remembering is not, when it works, a simple act of “recalling” or “evoking”. It implies 
the transmutation of some material into a new form in order to be brought into the 
psychic field where the functions of remembering and integration can occur 
(Scarfone, 2011). The transmutation mentioned by Scarfone thus involves different 
levels of symbolization.  
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Jacobs’ two forms of enactment (nonverbal and fantasy/thought-mediated) 
contain an implicit symbolization theory. Enactments are seen as actualizations of 
relational scenarios where unconscious, poorly symbolized material is activated both 
in the patient and in the analyst. This is seen as an unavoidable part of the analytic 
interaction, and the outcome depends on the analytic couple’s ability to bring the 
enactment into the psychic field. 
Steiner’s position, which is representative for some Kleinians, with the 
tendency to view thought and action as dichotomous, also implies a theory of 
symbolization, albeit not explicitly formulated. 
As discussed above, the relational school holds that thought and action are 
two sides of the same coin, and its members seem to place enactment in a different 
theoretical context. In the relational school, understanding enactment in terms of a 
need for symbolization of poorly symbolized (for example, trauma-related) material 
tends not to be given consideration and remains vague [needs checking with 
authors].  
Freedman and coworkers’ research on analytic process, which belongs to 
modern American psychoanalysis, is the only work have found that elaborates 
symbolization and trauma in relation to enactments (Freedman, Hurvich, & Ward, 
2011). 
 
3. Enactment as failure versus enactment as an inevitable part of the psychoanalytic 
process 
Here the dividing line falls mainly between some Kleinians, who view enactment as 
failure, on the one hand, and modern American psychoanalysts, relational 
psychoanalysts and also the German and French traditions on the other hand, within 
which enactment is seen as an unforeseeable and inevitable event; some 
unconscious material may surface only by action.  
For some writers, enactment is an inevitable part of the analytic process , 
although it is understood in different ways, and even if it may be described as a 
“mistake” (see Chused and Raphling, 1992), it is what we as analysts have to deal 
with as part of our ordinary work procedures. Boesky (1990, p. 573) states that “If the 
analyst does not get emotionally involved sooner or later in a manner that he had not 
intended, the analysis will not proceed to a successful conclusion” . 
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Goldberg (2002), from a self psychological perspective, holds that it is 
meaningless to discuss whether enactments are failures or not. They are possible 
ways of bringing material (repressed or disavowed) into the psychoanalytic field and 
are seen as misunderstandings that either can remain outside scrutiny or be clarified 
through interpretations.  
 
4. Involvement of the analyst’s subjectivity 
There is agreement that enactment is a process in which the analyst’s subjectivity 
becomes involved. Representatives of the relational perspective claim that the 
analyst’s subjectivity is involved all the time and at all levels of the analytic 
relationship. It is not possible to hide one’s subjectivity; moreover, the analyst’s 
subjectivity (including his unconscious motivation) will exert its influence generally on 
interpretations, in attitude, in handling the setting, and so on.  
While most contributors acknowledge that each analytic dyad is unique, in that 
the analyst’s and patient’s personalities and idiosyncrasies will decisively set their 
stamp on it, relational theorists hold that this fact will require that the analyst also 
reveals for the patient his own reactions, feelings, or impulses at critical moments in 
the analytic process. Benjamin created a concept, “the moral third”, which can 
survive ruptures of the analytic attitude and failures; it helps to replace the ideals of 
invulnerability and complete containing. The analyst’s acknowledgement (of failure) 
can be a way of demonstrating his capacity to tolerate that he can accept scrutiny by 
the other, to transform the complementary see-saw of blame, and invite the patient to 
be an interpreter of the analyst and a co-creator of dialogue, and so develop his own 
sense of agency and responsibility (Benjamin, 2009). 
Jacobs and Steiner both hold that enactments “hook” on to unconscious 
conflicts or traumas in the analyst that have not been worked through. Often the 
pressure from the patient (projective identification, actualization) creates a 
narcissistic imbalance (Ellman, 2010) in the analyst, prompting action instead  of 
containment, thought and, possibly, interpretation. 
 
5. Usefulness versus harmfulness 
Enactment may be potentially harmful when seen as a failure of containment 
(Steiner, 2000, Chused & Raphling, 1992) or as a mistake that delays the analytic 
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process (Chused & Raphling, 1992). There is, however, congruence in the view that 
what happens after the enactment will be decisive for the outcome – that is , whether 
the enactment is harmful or not. Even if enactment is a failure (Steiner) or inevitable 
(Jacobs), self-analysis and analysis of the transference–countertransference 
situation may ameliorate the situation and also bring new insight and progress.  
Seeing enactment as a failure implies that it can (and should) be avoided. In 
contrast, accepting that enactment is unavoidable shifts the focus to how to work with 
enactment in order to reach a beneficial outcome. 
Levenson views enactment as ubiquitous, as an ongoing process 
accompanying all aspects of the analytic dialogue. The question of harmfulness then 
becomes irrelevant, and one may question whether Levenson and other relational 
analysts are in fact describing a different phenomenon. 
 
6. Mechanisms of induction 
Enactment, according to the view of Kleinians and the modern American school, is a 
specific moment when the analyst is drawn into a situation with mutual acting: a 
scenario where thinking and reflection are foreclosed. The pressure is usually 
understood as originating from the patient, although mutual or reciprocal pressure 
may be seen (Mc Laughlin, 1991; McLaughlin and Johan, 1992) where the analyst’s 
conflicts reinforce the patient’s tendency to act. An unconscious fantasy is actualized 
in the transference, the pressure is mediated via projective identification, and the 
analyst “acts in” due to unresolved countertransference problems.  
Seeing enactment as ubiquitous (as per the relational school) makes the study 
of specific mechanisms of induction less relevant. 
 
7. Conception of the setting 
Negotiations of the setting (fees, times, etc.) are a possible arena for enactments. 
With some illuminating examples, Goldberg (2002) demonstrates that any change – 
be it lenience or strictness – can provoke enactments. He views these as mutual 
misunderstandings and underlines that they must be brought into the analytic 
dialogue. The analytic relationship aims at mutual understanding, and enactments 
are situations of misunderstanding that can either go unrecognized (e.g., be 
disavowed) or be interpreted and thereby further the analytic process. Goldberg’s 
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view seems to be in line with that of mainstream ego psychology, and his contribution 
is to focus on this often unrecognized arena for enactments. 
 
Section 5  
Integration of the different conceptualizations of enactment 
Is there a relatively unified conception of enactment in psychoanalysis? The answer 
must be no. The short investigation described in the previous section has 
demonstrated significant differences between different viewpoints. Enactment cannot 
at the same time be a ubiquitous phenomenon describing the inevitable mark of the 
analyst’s (unconscious) subjectivity on the dyad (as in the relational view) and be a 
specific situation co-created by the patient’s and analyst’s unresolved conflicts. 
The definition of enactment as a deviation from an analytic technique which is 
understood as normative or ideal should be the main focus when discussing the 
problem of establishing whether, and to what degree, the different conceptions can 
be integrated. We wish to discuss in more detail the dimension “Enactment as failure 
versus enactment as inevitable part of the psychoanalytic process”, which was briefly 
described earlier. Of course, it would be possible to group the different versions of 
the concept of “enactment” according to other criteria or dimensions, and we would 
probably get different results in terms of integration. For a more intensive analysis of 
the concept it would be necessary to proceed similarly with all the dimensions we 
described in the previous section, in order to see all the similarities and real 
differences between the various conceptions of enactment. However, we have limited 
our discussion to the dimension of “failure” because it seems to be the most 
important. Here, we use the idea of a continuum from “enactment as a failure” to 
“enactment as a normal part of the interactions of the analytic dyad” to bring the 
different conceptions into an order.   
At one pole of the continuum we can place the Kleinian conception of John 
Steiner. He emphasizes that the analytic relationship constantly creates tensions to 
act in the analyst. The task of the analyst is to contain the tension and to control the 
pressure to act. “An important possibility for communication emerges if the analyst 
can contain his propensity to action since he can then look at the pressures put on 
him and the feelings aroused in him as part of the situation that needs to be 
understood” (REFERENCE NEEDED HERE). This is the desirable ideal state. 
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However, quite often the analyst becomes aware of what has happened only after he 
has been drawn into an enactment. Enactments are understood as failures to contain 
and breaches of the setting. They are often the expression of the analyst’s resistance 
to the analytic method and setting. Enactments can provide helpful information, but 
by definition they cross the boundary from thought to action and, unless they are 
recognized and regulated, they can enter the grey area between normal technique, 
technical error, and unethical boundary violation. To varying degrees they are always 
harmful, but nevertheless, the dangers have to be accepted. 
Near to the Kleinian conception of enactment as failure, but with a different 
metapsychology, we can place the conceptualization of Arnold Goldberg, a 
representative of the self psychological tradition. Goldberg developed a hermeneutic 
conception of psychoanalysis and sees the analyst–patient dyad generally as an 
effort to enhance mutual understanding. He differentiates disruptions of the ordinary 
and usual reactions of the analyst, which do not come into discourse afterwards, from 
disruptive enactments that the analyst is able to discover and to bring into discourse. 
These reactions can be discussed between analyst and patient and understood as 
something being wrong and as an act of misunderstanding. Goldberg bases his 
conception not so much on an ideal state of analytic behavior, but more on the 
development of the concrete dyad in the course of the treatment. He emphasizes that 
much of what is seen as ordinary and usual depends on the individual characteristics 
of the analyst. Therefore, what is enactment for one person is routine for another. A 
proper explanation of enactment can belong only to that individual. 
We can place the conception of Jessica Benjamin in this part of the 
continuum, too, although she has an intersubjective metapsychology. Therefore, her 
conception also has to be integrated into the group of relational conceptions. 
Benjamin has sought a way to transform psychoanalytic thinking regarding 
enactments, not only because it is necessary to recognize the unconscious role of 
the analyst, but because she believes that dissociated traumatic material and painful 
affects can usually be activated only within such relational enactments. In 
enactments the analyst and patient repeat old injuries, and if the analyst does not 
acknowledge them he becomes a failed witness. In many cases the analyst needs to 
openly admit a moment of injury he has caused by playing his part and create a 
consensual validation of it, because this allows the dissociated painful affect into the 
31 
 
room. Benjamin calls this the creation of “a moral third” that can survive the failure of 
the analyst. The analyst’s acknowledgement of his failure can help to replace the 
ideals of invulnerability and complete containing as goals of treatment. 
Theodore Jacobs can be placed next on the continuum line, halfway, so to 
speak, between the Kleinians and the position of many modern American ego 
psychological analysts. For him, enactments are motivated by unconscious conflicts 
of the analyst. They are situations in which particular needs, conflicts, and biases of 
the analyst (not infrequently rooted in narcissistic conflicts) lie embedded within, and 
are concealed by, his quite proper and correct interventions. These enactments 
clearly serve defensive purposes. Self-reflection on the part of the analyst lets 
relevant memories emerge into consciousness. Jacobs oscillates between a one-
person-psychology and a two-person-psychology. Besides the enactments that are 
unconsciously motivated by the analyst, he described a second group in which each 
member of the therapeutic dyad seeks to impose on the other an intrapsychic 
relationship. These enactments have first to be enacted before they can be 
recognized. 
The middle position of the continuum is taken by a group of modern American 
ego psychological analysts. For them, enactments, particularly countertransference 
enactments, are universal and inevitable. They are the consequence of the 
vulnerability of the analyst. Although in this sense enactments are failures, they are 
no longer evaluated in such a way. According to Chused, enactments occur when a 
patient’s behavior or words stimulate an unconscious conflict in the analyst, leading 
to an interaction that has unconscious meaning to both. McLaughlin goes a step 
further in the direction of an interpersonal conception. For him, enactments are co-
constituted as a consequence of shared regression. They are “events occurring in 
the analytic dyad that both parties experience as being the consequence of behavior 
in the other . . . Close scrutiny of the interpersonal behaviors shaped between the 
pair will provide clues and cues leading to latent intrapsychic conflicts and residues of 
prior object relations that one has helped to stir into resonance in the other, and 
between them actualized for both” (McLaughlin 1991, p. 80). McLaughlin emphasizes 
enactment as a “conjoint process of attempted mutual influence and persuasion” 
(1991, p. 84). But it happens only when the stirred-up conflicts in the analyst and the 
patient fit together, meaning that they are in an interactional resonance to each other. 
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Also in the middle of the continuum we can place Bionian conceptions such as 
that of Cassorla, who relates his conception of enactment to that of the “analytic field” 
of the Barangers: “The term enactment indicates discharges that occur in the analytic 
field, discharges that involve both members of the analytic dyad through a process of 
mutual induction”(Cassorla 2011, p. 4). In enactment there is a deep contact between 
the dyad’s two unconscious minds. Chronic enactments are, in a Bionian sense, 
prolonged non-dreams-for-two with obstructive collusion and mutual discharges. 
We place the conceptions of the relational psychoanalysts at the other pole of 
the continuum. For Stern (2011), enactments are dissociated states, which are 
unformulated, unsymbolized experiences and dynamically unconscious. Enactment 
takes place between two separate subjectivities. The patient can provoke such a 
dissociated state in the analyst only if he is vulnerable to it.  The analyst’s 
dissociation is therefore as much a product of his own life as is the patient’s. Both 
parts have to come together; Stern calls this the “interpersonalization of dissociation”. 
Such types of conflicts based on dissociated states cannot be experienced within one 
mind, but only between or across two minds. “The state dissociated by the patient is 
explicitly experienced by the analyst, and the state explicitly experienced by the 
patient is dissociated in the analyst’s mind . . . Thus the creation of conflict and the 
negotiation of an enactment requires growth from the analyst in just the way it 
requires growth from the patient”(p 216). The two minds are mirror images of one 
another; they fit together like the two halves of a broken plate. 
For the intersubjective conceptions, enactment is a normal part of the analyst–
patient interaction. The analyst as “observing participant” must become unwittingly 
and irrationally lost in the interactional process. Therefore, enactments are 
spontaneous and authentic, and never premeditated. Awareness can happen only 
postenactment (Hirsch 1998). Through the analyst’s unwitting participation in 
countertransference enactments, the patient has the opportunity to live through key 
internalized configurations. For Levenson (2006), enactment is the transfer into 
behavior of something being talked about. Enactment is not simply a feeling of the 
analyst, but a pattern of behavior between the patient and analyst. More radically, 
Levenson sees enactment as a continuous and ubiquitous process, which is the 
behavioral component of what is being talked about: what is being said is 
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simultaneously being shown. For Levenson this is a semiotic fact and not limited to 
the treatment room.   
To summarize: When considering enactment as a failure, a deviation from an 
ideal state of an analytic attitude, we can group the different versions of the concept 
roughly into three main clusters: (1) Enactment as a failure to contain the tension in 
the analytic situation or as an act of misunderstanding of the patient–analyst dyad; 
(2) Enactment as a stimulation and actualization of an unconscious conflict that has 
meaning to both patient and analyst but cannot be represented otherwise; (3) 
Enactment as a continuous and ubiquitous process, which is the behavioral 
component of what is being talked about. It does not appear to us to be possible to 




1. Considering that enactment is a concept that has been adopted by analysts from 
various schools of thought, it is unavoidable that the concept will be put to a different 
use and given different connotations depending on how analysts conceive of their 
“normal” set of analytic procedures and their ensuing process. This is why what is 
apparently a common set of phenomena occurring within the psychoanalytic setting 
is, nevertheless, assessed as a failure by some, an unavoidable state of affairs by 
others, while yet others look upon it as an opportunity. Furthermore, we have to 
realize that theories that understand enactment as a failure on a clinical level can 
have radically different basic assumptions on a metapsychological level. However, 
this should not deter us from trying to reach a definition that could take advantage of 
the different approaches in order to bring to light some underlying common set of 
features. This could be done in a way that would not become prescriptive at the level 
of clinical usage, but, rather, would favor furthering the dialogue between analysts 
from different theoretical orientations. 
2. Enactment as a phenomenon is concerned with actions. As our discussion of the 
genealogy of the concept has shown, in the history of psychoanalytic theory, 
beginning with “acting-out“, there have always been efforts to conceptualize elements 
of actions in the psychoanalytic situation. In our study we found that theoretical 
statements and recommended clinical attitudes related to the phenomenon of 
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enactment are at most implicitly connected to some basic assumptions about actions 
in general. What is missing in psychoanalysis is a comprehensive theory of action. 
When thinking about such a general theory of action, some problems have to be kept 
in mind: We have to discuss whether agreement can be reached on the use of terms, 
both old and new, for different but related clinical phenomena. It is not enough to 
decide on the nature, the motivation, and the goals of a given action only on the 
basis of explicit, conscious descriptions of the patient’s or analyst’s behavior in the 
analytic setting. Any observable action has to be additionally understood and labeled 
on the basis of its unconscious content. Another observation of our study was that 
actions and enactments are often categorized as unsymbolized or as an expression 
of a symbolic breakdown. It seems to us necessary to combine a theory of action 
with a theory of symbolization in order to consider actions in general as expressions 
of the content of different levels of mental functioning.  
3. The subjective reactions of the analyst that deviate from the “ideal” frame of 
reference are the subject to be conceptually grasped and defined. The advantage 
and the appeal of the term “enactment” is that it can be used to describe certain 
reactions of the analyst that might otherwise be dismissed as “inadequate” analytical 
actions. This kind of clearing up has given these reactions a productive meaning for 
the analytic treatment process. It seems to us that this clinical benefit is the reason 
that enactment has become such a widely used concept. The analyst’s subjectivity, 
his spontaneity and his vulnerability have to receive recognition as necessary and 
consistent components of clinical treatment theory.  
4. However, the problem for this theory is whether it is possible to integrate this 
phenomenon of “enactment” into psychoanalytic theory in a way that conceptualizes 
it not only as a breaking of the technical rules but simultaneously as an event that 
cannot be avoided and as a phenomenon that can have positive consequences for 
the treatment process. These ways of conceptualizing enactment seem to be 
mutually contradictory, not on a clinical but on a theoretical level, and we are 
confronted with the question of how to resolve this contradiction. In Section 2, where 
we consider enactment as a clinical phenomenon, we have shown that enactment is 
not just an action or an occurrence, but an intersubjective process comprising five 
stages. Keeping this in mind, it does not seem sufficient to understand enactment 
only with a figure–ground model (with the rules as the ground and enactment as the 
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figure) because the dynamics of the phenomenon will fall short in this model. One 
way to resolve this problem on a new level of theoretical discussion is to 
conceptualize it as a process in a frame of reference which has similarities to a 
dialectical movement. The dynamics of the rules on the one side, and their negation 
in the enactment on the other side, can give rise to a synthesis of a new mutual and 
intersubjective process of understanding. Benjamin has taken a similar route with her 
concept of the “moral third”. Ogden is moving in the same direction with his concept 
of “the analytic third”, not with the concept of enactment, but with the understanding 
of the analytic situation as a whole. 
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